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It's a persistent agony for
farmers,

elevators,

and railroads:

toe

few rail cars to move grain to market.
The agony is more than the frus

public officials may be forced

to venture into uncharted waters.

This

report is an attempt to assist decision
makers in evaluating the probable
success of such a move.

tration of not being able to freely
respond to market moves.

It is out-of

pocket costs for storage,

and it is a

History and causes of the
rail car shortages

loss of income that might have been
received,

could the grain have moved.

For example,

one study estimated

the total cost from the lack of trans

1969 to Iowf
$2.36 million.

Seasonal shortages of rail cars is
an old problem.

The very first case

heard before the Interstate Commerce

portation equipment in

Commission

elevators alone was

complaint by the North Dakota Board of

(ICC)

in

1887

"involved a

Railroad Commissioners against the
Private industry has not found an
answer to rail car shortages.

State

governments are beginning to suggest

Northern Pacific Railway for failing to
provide adequate
Dakota shippers."

ar service to North
Z

solutions.
Again,
During the
session,

1980

legislative

the South Dakota governor

suggested the purchase of rail cars by
the state to supplement railroad and
elevator fleets.

"as early as

190 7

the ICC

held extensive hearings on freight car
shortages,

receiving testimony from

shippers of grain,

coal,

and lumber on

their inability to obtain freight cars
in sufficie t numbers at the time

�

requested."
South Dakota is not alone in
examining the purchase of.rail cars.
The Highway and Transportation Depart
ment in Michigan has made a similar
proposal.

North Dakota recently con

cluded a feasibility study on the same
alternative.

In October

katchewan ordered

1000

19 7 9,

Sas

covered hopper

rail cars.
This is a new approach to relieve
equipment shortages.

But when past

attempts to resolve a problem have

In the fall of

the Joint

created by a Senate resolution,
that "the supply of box cars,
cars,

stock cars,

found

coal

and refrigerator cars

is inadequate to meet the demand during
normal periods of actjyity aDd should
be rapidly augmented.'8
In

1953,

William Hudson found that

"a tight boxcar situation with periodic
shortages,

1

1921,

Commission of Agricultural Inquiry,

particularly of the better

class of equipment required for grain
All footnotes in this bulletin are

located on page

14.

and grain products,

will probably cgn

tinue over the next several years."

3

Elevators have started acquiring

rather than the predictable pattern of
grain production.

private fleets to reach markets but
this has not been an answer, either.

3.

Fewer general purpose cars

which can be c nverted to haul grain
No single factor is the primary

are available.

�

cause of the continuing shortage of
rail cars.

Instead,

the shortage has
Railroads and shippers are con

come from the interaction of numerous
economic and non-economic factors over
time:

stantly striving to reduce labor re
quirements while providing greater
protection for cargo.

1.

The railroads have failed to

share in the general economic pros

The result has

been the demise of the plain, 40-foot,
narrow door boxcar.

It has been re

placed by cars specifically designed

perity.

and equipped to meet the requirements
of individual commodities.

They have earned an average of
return on investment between

1979;

during the last

return averaged

1.6%.6

5

1964

2�%

and

years the

This results,

however; in an in

flexible car fleet which cannot serve
multiple uses as transportation demands

Railroad

earnings are not sufficient to meet all

change.

their capital requirements,

loaded miles has decreased from

and the low

rate of return discourages reinvesting

Therefore the percentage of

total miles in

1946

to 57.9% in

67% of
1979.

railroad earnings back into the rail
road and also fails to attract outside
capital.

2.

4.

Rail rates remain stable

throughout the year, failing to reflect

The seasonal production

,pattern of grain, combined with year
to-year variation in foreign demand,

the seasonality of grain production or
to allocate demand over time.

creates shortages and surpluses of rail

equipment over time.

While the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of

The result is that "carriers may
invest in capacity that is under
utilized during off-peak periods or use
existing capacity so intensively that
costs increase in greater proportion
7
than output."

Act)

(RRRR

1976

addressed this issue by instruct

ing the ICC "to provide sufficient

incentive to shippers to reduce peak
O
seasonal rates
period shipments,"l
were not widely adopted and the pro
vision was repealed in

5.

1980.

Low per diem rates do not

encourage car ownership.
These changes in demand over

Per diem rates are the fees paid

time can be compounded by agricultural
production practices.

For example,

the

by one railroad to another for using

technological development and adapta

rail cars and are established by the

tion of the picker sheller and corn

American Association of Railroad

dryer increased

and the ICC.

(from

to

29

59%)

the

(AAR)

Historically they have

amount of corn moving dir ctly to Iowa

been maintained at a level which is

elevators during harvest.

below cost to the railroad owning the

3

car.
Increases in farm storage capacity
also provided farmers with the ability
to alter historical marketing patterns.

The low level of per diem fees
continues primarily through the efforts

This creates surges in grain movements

of those railroads whose total car

in response to changes in grain demand

usage is greater than their ownership.

4

These carriers are located within
territories which terminate more inter
regional carloads than are originated.
Historically, these have been the
eastern roads.
The western roads, including those
serving South Dakota, are forced to
interline carloads of traffic with
eastern carriers. Rather than invest
in cars to meet their needs, the defi
cit carriers simply keep the cars and
use them as long as they are needed.
During periods of car surpluses,
cars are returned to the owning carrier
empty, while westbound loads are loaded
in the cars owned by the deficit
carriers. In addition to an increase
in empty miles, which use additional
resources, this practice also places a
disproportionate share of the cost of
the car surplus upon railroads having
an adequate car supply.
The Association of American Rail
roads instituted a multilevel per diem
rate on January 1, 1964. Grunfield
surnmarized, the impact of the per diem
J.. l
.
.
-:..ncentive,
( a)
a per diem rate which was
less than prospective daily owner
ship costs of a new freight car
would lead to an overall defi
ciency in freight car ownership;
( b ) a single per diem rate would
discourage the purchase of the
more expensive freight cars with
their greater annual depreciation
expense; and ( c ) a seasonally
inflexible per diem rate would
fail to equate freight car demand
with opportunity costs during peak
and off-peak periods.

6.
Existing demurrage charges
make rail cars economical storage
alternatives during periods of storage
stress.
Demurrage is the fee that shippers
and receivers pay for holding a rail
car beyond the normal time necessary
for loading or unloading. While the

daily demurrage rate increases with
time, elevators which are filled be
cause of heavy grain movement still
find rail cars an economical storage
alternative. Unfortunately, this
inefficient use of grain cars normally
occurs during harvest periods when car
shortages often are greatest.

7.
The ICC is charged with the
responsibility of protecting the public
interest and must decide between the
interests of large and small shippers.
Large elevators, capable of ship
ping unit trains, use rail cars much
more efficiently than smaller eleva
tors. According to an Iowa study, the
movement of grain in unit trains re
quires only 28% of the number of cars
that would be needed to transport the
12
grain in single car movements.
Thus
the ICC is charged with choosing be
tween efficiency and equity.
A recent policy limited the per
centage of cars used in unit trains,
consequently protecting the interests
of the smaller and branchline elevators
while reducing the total amount of
grain which is moved.
In August 1980 the responsibility
for car service was shifted to the AAR.
Renewed emphasis on efficiency will
likely lead to policies improving car
utilization to the detriment of smaller
shippers.
8.
An eighth factor is the
limited capacity of American rail car
builders.
Over the past decade, purchasers
have faced order backlogs which have
delayed delivery of grain cars for many
months. This backlog limits the abil
ity of railroads or elevators to
respond quickly to changes in demand
and it also means public purchases
will delay private purchases.
9.
The most important factor
contributing to rail car shortages is
that ownership of cars is simply not
5

profitable for either railroads or
elevators.
This is discussed in the
following section.

The economics of
public car ownership
Owning or leasing rail cars is
unprofitable for both elevators and
railroads. If it were profitable,
railroads would be buying cars, rather
than reducing investment as they have
in the past.
During the last 10 years,
for example, class one railroads re
duced their car owner i hip by over
20, 000 cars per year. 3
The argument can also be extended
to shippers who would gladly purchase
cars if they were a good investment.
Shippers have also been reluctant
investors. While shipper-owned or
leased cars increased by over 6, 400 13
units per year between 1969 and 1979,
they were not purchased as an invest
ment but rather as a necessary cost of
doing business.
Rail markets often pay more for
grain than truck markets, and elevators
need rail cars to receive the higher
bid. Since railroads do not provide
enough rail cars the elevators have had
to acquire their own.
They lose money
on their private fleets, but the higher
price received for the grain offsets
the loss and their total income is
increased.
The major variables that influence
profit in owning rail cars are turn
around time, car cost, and mileage
credits (Table 1) .
Turnaround is the number of trips
a car makes each month and is usually
higher if the car is in a unit train.
Car co.sts can be estimated either
through a lease or purchase price.
Both methods are used extensively by
shippers. Mileage credits are the fees
paid by railroads to shippers when
shippers use their own car.
The early
1980 rate was 24 cents per loaded mile
,for covered hopper cars.
6

Table 1 reveals that car lease
payments exceed mileage earnings for
Histori
all reasonable assumptions.
cally, rail car investments have not
been profitable for carriers or ship
pers.
(Figures in Table 1 represent
actual turnaround experienced by pri
vate shippers. )
State owned or leased cars would
incur the same kind of deficit requir
ing continuing operating support in
addition to the initial cost.
For
these reasons, railroads and elevators
have not purchased grain cars.

Turnaround and public
ownership of rail cars
A major factor contributing to
grain car availability is the effi
ciency with which rail cars are used
(turnaround) .

Efficiency and equity
Throughout their history, rail
roads have been charged with discrimi
nation against some shippers in the
allocation of cars. Through the pur
chase of rail equipment the state could
attempt to alleviate this.

As the railroads already have, the
state will find, however, that effi
ciency and equity are often mutually
exclusive goals.
The elevators which are experienc
ing the greatest shortage are also the
most expensive to serve, i. e., the
small or branchline elevators.
If it
serves these elevators, the state will
reduce turnaround and increase the net
cost per bushel.
The state would have to choose
between efficiency and equity, between
moving the greater volume of grain for
each dollar invested and serving all
the elevators in South Dakota. This
would be an extremely difficult deci
sion for any public employee.

Assignment problems
The state could assign cars per
manently to individual shippers, but
this would result in a fleet which
would be inflexible and unresponsive to
changes in demand.
Further, a permanent assignment
based on shipper needs is difficult to
justify. If a shipper would benefit
enough to merit a permanently assigned
state car, he should invest in a pri
vate fleet.
The state could also assign the
cars to the railroad's fleet, but this
would mean the carriers would allocate
the cars. And if the cars ever re
turned to South Dakota, the same allo
cation problems created by the rail
roads in the past would continue.
Empty cars could also be assigned
after each trip but this requires extra
handling by the railroads and takes
extra time, which increases costs.

business recognizes this may happen,
that to maximize long-term profits, an
occasional short-term loss may be
incurred.
Considering the political problems
that could result if state owned rail
cars were moving fertilizer during a
grain car shortage, it is unlikely any
public official could advocate a co
lease.
Under existing tariff regula
tions 14 railroads need not accept
private (state owned) cars during
periods of car surpluses.
And the
significant variation in the volume of
grain marketed within and between crop
years can quickly turn car shortages
into surpluses.
For example, weekly shortages of
8, 000 covered hoppers during October
1976 evaporated into surpluses of
nearly 5, 000 cars per week by the end
of the year. Surpluses also existed
during most of May through September
1977 (Table 2) .

Management
The elevators which have used
their fleets the most efficiently have
hired full-time traffic managers. A
fleet of 1,000 cars would take a mini
mum staff of three state employees and
a high-speed computer compatible with
the railroad computers.
Periods of surplus equipment
The seasonality of grain
marketing creates fluctuations in
demand for transportation services.
Some firms have gotten around this and
achieved a higher level of utilization
by co-leasing with shippers with dif
ferent seasonal demand patterns.
For
example, grain dealers and fertilizer
dealers occasionally co-lease equip
ment, and each shipper uses the cars
during his period of greatest need.
Occasionally, a shipper will find
that seasonal patterns have fluctuated,
and he needs the cars when they are
assigned to the co-lessee. A private

During the time of surplus equip
ment, the state would encounter the
same dilemma as the other non-rail
owners:
how to capitalize on an in
vestment which is continuing to incur
costs but which cannot be used.
In addition, cars not in use incur
a storage charge if they are held on a
railroad-owned siding, and many eleva
tors in South Dakota do not own their
sidings.
The problem of surplus equipment
could be resolved in the short run by
requiring that publicly owned rail cars
be utilized before carrier or shipper
supplied equipment.
This would mini
mize the net public cost, but as the
railroads and elevators became the
residual car supplier, utilization of
their equipment would decrease, making
ownership more expensive and encourag
ing an even faster disinvestment for
railroads and the reduction of shipper
investment. This would be counter
productive to the long run objective
7

that state provision of rail cars was
designed to achieve.
Impact of public provision
upon car supply

In spite of potential management
difficulties or operating costs, the
critical issue in determining if the
state should purchase rail cars is the
long-run impact. Will public provision
permanently increase the total supply
of rail cars available for South Dakota
grain shippers, or could the supply
actually be decreased over time?
The answer is dependent upon the
expected behavior or response of existing
car owners, including railroads and
elevators.

If one assumes that public invest
ment will have no impact upon either
private investment or car allocation,
the additional investor would increase
the total car supply and relieve a
portion of the cost imposed by short
ages.
Unfortunately, this is an unlikely
outcome for several reasons.

First, limited capacity exists for
building rail cars, and delivery us
ually varies from between 1 and 2
years. Consequently, the total number
of cars which can be manufactured will
not increase with state purchase, and
an investment would simply delay de
livery to private purchasers.
Second,
the assumption does not consider the
economic incentives for either the
railroad or elevators which own or
lease cars.
If, on the other hand, one assumes
that the railroads and shippers will
react, naturally in the manner that
will best benefit them, the effective
increase in rail cars will be far less
than the state's purchase.
In fact, it
is possible that the long-term impact
will be to reduce the number of cars
8

We cannot
available to move grain.
expect that current car owners will not
react.
Railroads have existed in a highly
regulated environment for many years
and have learned to make calculated
decisions based upon the response they
expect from the public sector.
In
fact, railroads are often accused of
strategic manipulation in other deci
sion making processes such as branch
line abandonment cases. It would
indeed be unfortunate for those who
I
consider themselves victims of present
railroad manipulative behavior to
design new institutions which would
encourage further behavior of a simi
lar nature!
These allegations, however, are
simply charges that the railroads are
attempting to maximize profits within
the parameters in which they work.
There is little reason to expect them
to alter their profit-maximizing be
havior when planning car investment.
The continuing low rate of return
to car ownership provides no incentive
for the railroads to purchase addi
tional cars or even to maintain the
existing fleet. It is more profitable
to disinvest in rail cars and use the
capital for other purposes, very likely
non-rail investment.
A change in the rules of the game
will encourage railroads to carry this
further. If they believe that states
will purchase rail cars, they will
encourage even greater public invest
ment. This could be accomplished by
(1) continuation of their disinvestment
policy and (2) reassigning cars to
states not purchasing rail cars.
The other major source of grain
cars is the elevators, which have
become unwilling investors in response
to the railroad's disinvestment.

Rail cars are profitable for grain
elevators because greater net returns
can be secured in rail-based markets.

But because of rail disinvestment,
carrier supplied cars are not readily
available, and many elevators have
responded by purchasing or leasing
cars.
However, mileage credits do not
offset lease costs; consequently, the
rail cars themselves result in a net
cost.

The exact outcome is difficult to
call without estimating supply and
demand functions.
However, there is no
doubt that in the short run, the in
crease in the total supply of grain cars
will be significantly less than the
number of cars the state purchased.
A decrease in the supply of rail cars

Thus while access to their own
rail cars is profitable for elevators
access to someone else's car is even
more profitable.
The elevators will
also approve rail equipment purchase by
the state.
The ultimate strategy which would
be adopted by elevators is, however
more difficult to project.

They have more to lose if rail cars
are unavailable, but they also have
better access to public opinion and to
state officials.
Consequently, they are
in a better position to affect public
behavior.
As long as shippers believe
that a public investment might be forth
coming, they will put off private in
vestment.
Shippers will also actively
encourage public investment through
lobbying and news releases.
Once the rumor starts of a possible
public purchase, the state must move
promptly and make a forceful decision.
As long as the decision remains un
resolved or private investors perceive
an irresolute decision, they will delay
addit ional rail car purchases.
Because public investment dis
courages private investment, once the
state has initiated a fleet, the pres
sure will be to expand the public fleet
as private owners disinvest.
Of course, it can be argued that
the state can purchase perhaps 1, 000
cars and announce that it is a one-time
transaction, never to be repeated.
This
is simply Round 2 of game theory.
In
Round 3, most shippers probably would
believe further public pressure could
force another round of state investment,
and then another.

It is possible, under some con
ditions, that by purchasing rail cars
the state would actually decrease the
supply which is available to move grain.
Should private investors believe
that additional public purchases are
possible, the long-term impact could
actually be a reduction in cars avail
able as private interests attempt to
"force" additional public investment.
Second, the ultimate measurement is
car capacity, which is a function of the
number of cars and the turnaround.
Turnaround for state owned cars may well
be less than for privately owned cars.
A decrease in turnaround amounts to
reduced capacity available to move
grain.
Third, railroads could shift
cars to other states.
Should each of these probable
outcomes occur, the long-term impact
would be a net decrease in the number of
cars available to move grain.
The fact that the net increase in
cars is less than the total state
purchase o+ cars yields interesting
economic results.
Normal accounting practices would
divide the total cost of owning the rail
fleet by the bushels of grain moved,
thus determining the state's cost per
bushel and measuring the effectiveness
of the stat e investment.
This would
underestimate the actual additional cost
per bushel.
The ne t cost per bushel of the
state car purchase should be determined
by dividing the total cost of the state
fleet by the number of bushels moved in
excess of the grain which would have
9

moved without the state purchase. If
the net additional car capacity is
significan�ly less than the state's
total acquisition, the cost of moving
the additional grain becomes rather
large.
Summary: impact of public provision
upon car supply
Analysis suggests that state
acquisition of rail cars would have
little positive impact upon the total
supply in the long run. It is also very
likely that the result would be a de
crease in the total supply. Conse
quently, any additional bushels of grain
moved would be extremely costly.
This plan addresses only the
symptoms and does not treat the causes.
The state does have some viable alterna
tives to public ownership available
which would address the causes, increase
car supply, and stabilize demand.

Viable alternatives to
increase rail car availability
Supply side modifications
Rental rates--in the form of per
diem, demurrage, and shipping rates--are
at a level below ownership costs.
An
unregulated pricing structure would
increase the return to car ownership and
would thereby encourage additional
investment.
A proven way to increase the supply
of rail cars is collective action be
tween various elevators.
In some instances the purchase of
rail cars has been included in an over
all cooperative effort such as building
a subterminal.
In other cases the only
collective action effort has been to
acquire and manage a cooperative fleet
of rail cars.
In spite of its success, collective
action has not become widely adopted in
South Dakota because of insufficient
information and organizational costs.
10

One answer would be a rail car expert
within the State Department of Transpor
tation. This individual would have the
needed information regarding all aspects
of car leases, including cost and risk,
and could facilitate organizational
efforts.
This institutional arrangement
would, of course, reinforce the rail
roads' current disinvestment strategy.

Demand side modifications
When grain prices are high or
during harvest season, cars can't be
found.
At other times, rail cars
stand idle.
If, by some method, de
mand 0an be spread out through the
year, existing cars will be used more
efficiently and new ones may not need
to be purchased.
Felton �as suggested a rail car
market in which potential users could
15
bid for railroad equipment.
In
addition to encouraging additional
investment on the supply side, this
would allocate equipment more eff ec
tively and partially eliminate the
problems of seasonal demand variation,
non-compensatory per diem and demurrage
rates, allocation among shippers, and
the decrease in utilization.

Other methods which would ef fec
tively change time of demand include
flexible rail rates and seasonal rates.
Should variable rates be implemented,
elevators could not lock in a transpor
tation rate as they contract grain for
future delivery.
Therefore, elevator
margin would widen unless a futures
market in transportation service were
developed to protect elevators against
transportation risk.
Wider margins
would be borne by the farmer.
However, the volume of grain
requiring transportation is too volatile
to suggest that these marginal changes
would be completely effective in
allocating demand over time.

While domestic demand for grain is
relatively stable over time, export
demand fluctuates greatly in response
to various factors such as weather
generated shortfalls of grain in other
countries, embargoes and other foreign
policy, and policies of other nations.
Each time export (and thus domestic)
prices decline, farmers react by
reducing the volume they are willing to
sell and increasing the amount they
store.
As part of its food policy, the
public sector responds by making on
farm storage easier. Both construction
and carrying charges are subsidized.
But when prices improve, an even larger
volume of grain will require transpor
tation, compounding car shorta ges and
creating even larger transportation
bottlenecks.
Again, a public policy designed to
assist a segment of the citizenry
generates reactions which may be totally
contrary to perceived public good.
It should be noted that on-farm
storage which allocates grain over the
marketing year contributes to the
orderly utilization of rail cars.
On
farm storage which enables farmers to
store production from more than one
crop year compounds the cyclical nature
of grain marketing and compounds car
allocation problems.

Direct farmer ownership of storage
facilities at ports would reduce build
up of grain at the point of production
and even out the seasonal demand for
cars.
Farmers, acting collectively,
would build storage facilities near a
port with some type of transfer to the
export houses.
Their grain would be
shipped via the normal mode, mixed with
grain of others, to this storage
facility during periods of low prices.
When an individual was ready to sell,
he would issue instructions to the
facility manager to deliver the grain
to an export house.
,

Obviously this suggestion is
plagued with numerous prohlems:
(1)
potential managerial difficulties, (2)
liability claims for transit or storage
damage, (3) unwillingness of local
elevators to load farmer-owned
grain, (4) lack of physical control by
farmers, and (5) the higher construc
tion, land, and tax costs at an urban
facility. Finally, farmers generally
do not count up all the costs of on
farm storage. Off-farm storage will
appear expensive by comparison.
Nevertheless, the potential bene
fits of a storage facility justify
further exploration.
The public sector
could facilitate collective action and
provide information.
Existing agricul
tural and food programs and tax laws
would also need to be modified before
off-farm storage could materialize.
The exact impact that direct
farmer ownership of storage facilities
at ports would have upon agricultural
production and marketing is unclear.
However, existing agricultural policy
and tax laws which encourage investment
in farm storage facilities beyond one
year's crop are probably going to
compound the rail car shortage over
time.
Conclusions
The state is correct that public
intervention is necessary before supply
and demand for rail cars will match
more evenly than they do now.
State purchase of rail cars will
not ease the problem of seasonal and
costly car shortages.
It may make the
situation even worse. Another entity,
whether it be private or government,
which will take over the expense of
owning rail cars is exactly what rail
roads and shippers want. They could
then reduce their own investments in
the cars and reinvest their money in
(for them) more economical assets.
Consequently, the increase in rail
car supply will be significantly less
than the total number of cars acquired
11

couraging collective and cooperative
action among the various elevators.

by the state. The final impact could
actually be a decrease in the total
supply of cars.

The problem of seasonal grain car
shortages will not go away until we
change or correct the causes of the
problem.
Only then will an adequate
fleet of cars be available to transport
grain produced in South Dakota.

A more positive and permanent
solution would be state activity en-

Table 1.

Cost of monthly rail car ownership

Assume:

(1)

(2)
(3)

Cost of
lease per
month

A 15-year lease signed during the first quarter of
1980. A likely lease rate would include a monthly
payment of $570 and an annual charge of $0.02 for each
mile over 30, 000. This rate is subject to increases
as maintenance costs increase.
Railroads pay $0.24 per loaded mile for privately
leased or owned covered hoppers during early 1980.
These figures represent 100% utilization, 12 months
per year. Costs increase rapidly if the cars are idle.

Number of loads
per month

Monthly
mileage credit
earned

Profit or (loss)
per car
per month

300-mile one-way trip
$570
570
570

] 1
2

3

$ 72
144
216

$(498)
(426)
(3 54)

700-mile one-way trip
570
576
604

1
1
22
3

168
336
504

(402)
(240)
(100)

15 00-mile one-way trip
580
640
640

l

1
3
1.66
24

360
600
5
525

(220)
( 40)
(l1 5)

Probable turnaround for single car movement, current turnaround for
Burlington Northern (BN)
2
Probable turnaround for unit train
3
Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using BN
4
Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Union Pacific
5
The Un ion Pacific has a lower rate rather than a mileage credit which works
out to about $0.175 per loaded mile
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Table 2.

Week

Surplus and

40-foot
narrow
door
box cars

(shortage) of the U. S. rail car supply for a 70-week period

Cove re d
hopper

Week

40-foot
narrow
door
box cars

Covered

hopper

9/ 4/76

9,311

(3,621)

5/ 7/77

3,946

9/11/76

9,220

(2,623)

5/14/77

5,284

627

9/25/76

9,185

(3,980

5/21/77

5,940

1,955

(996)

10/ 2/76

8,242

(4,017)

6/ 4/77

7,811

2,577

10/ 9/76

7,346

(3,919)

6/11/77

8,238

2,020
386

10/16/76

3,673

(8,130)

6/18/77

8,595

10/23/76

3,072

(9,142)

6/25/77

705

10/30/76

3,209

(8,056)

7I 2/77

8,302
7,912

1,486

11/ 6/76

2,740

(7,261)

7/ 9/77

6,318

(32)

11/13/76

6,329

(5,671)

7/16/77

5,140

(62)

11/20/76

7,509

(3,848)

7/23/77

3,773

(1,415)

11/27/76

9,500

(1,104)

7/30/77

3,024

(1,035)

12/ 4/76

10,923

1,463

8/ 6/77

2,656

(1,050)

12/11/76

11,129

2,800

8/13/77

2,251

(543)

12/18/76

11,805

4,884

8/20/77

3,121

41

12/25/76

12,996

5,216

8/27/77

3,129

1,098
1,935

1/ 1/77

12,734

5,279

9/ 3/77

3,706

1/ 8/77

11,695

2,641

9/10/77

3,542

949

1/15/77

10,700

9/17/77

3,030

(897)

(835)

1

1/22/77

7,980

(3,624)

9/24/77

2,202

(2,052)

1/29/77

3,714

(7,291)

10/ 1/77

1,246

(4,111)

2/ 5/77

1,433

(9,666)

10/ 8/77

462

2/12/77

(1,053)

10/15/77

(4, 647)

(12,140)

175

(3,753)

2/19/77

(1,722)

(11,957)

10/22/77

(269)

(6,836)

2/26/77

(2,213)

(10,050)

10/29/77

(837)

(8,145)

3/ 5/77

(2,924

(11,433)

11/ 5/77

(1,157)

(9,796)

3/12/77

(2,479)

(11, 381)

11/12/77

(1,226)

(9,100)

3/19/77

(1,550)

(10,839)

11/19/77

(1,255)

(9,215)

3/26/77

(1,042)

(9,246)

11/26/77

(1,202)

(7,464)

4/ 2/77

(1,028)

(8,321)

12/ 3/77

(1,851)

(7,186)

4/ 9/77

(817)

(7,396)

12/10/77

(1,655)

(6,947)

4/16/77

(301)

(6,994)

12/17/77

(1,512)

(7,068)

4/23/77

(1,018)

(5,921)

12/24/77

(1,353)

(7 ,182)

4/30/77

1,445

(4,378

12/31/77

(1,273)

(6,865)

1
North Dakota Public Service Commission. Preliminary report on feasibility of state
of North Dakota acquiring a covered hopper rail fleet. Bismarck, N. Dak. , Nov. 1978.
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